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THE SANCTITY OF CONSCIENCE IN AN AGE OF SCHOOL
CHOICE: GROUNDS FOR SKEPTICISM
ROBERT K. VISCHER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The sanctity of individual conscience looms large in our
society's understanding of religious liberty. While the state long ago
forsook its authority to regulate the contours of the individual's
religious devotion directly, there are a myriad of efforts to utilize law
to shape the relationship between an individual's religious devotion
and her participation in the marketplace of essential public goods and
services. Individual providers regularly look to law to defend their
integration of the dictates of conscience with their professional
identities, even when the integration impacts the provision of goods
deemed foundational to a meaningful human existence, like health
care. In recent months, for example, a state-by-state legislative battle has
raged over the extent to which pharmacists may allow their religiously
shaped moral judgments to narrow the range of prescriptions they fill.
But the lure of conscience is not limited to providers; conscience also
is invoked to mandate access to essential goods on terms that
maximize consumer autonomy, even at the cost of negating the
efficacy of providers' diametrically opposed consciences. Such was
the impetus behind California's recent enactment of legislation
requiring employers, including a vehemently resistant Catholic
Charities, to include contraceptives within their coverage of
prescription drugs.2
This trend is unmistakable, if more subtly apparent, in other
fields, including education. On the provider side, teachers have long
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1. See Robert K. Vischer, Conscience in Context: Pharmacist Rights and the Eroding
Moral Marketplace, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 83 (2006).
2. See Susan Stabile, State Attempts to Define Religion: The Ramifications of Applying
Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to Religious Employers, 28 HARv. J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 741 (2005).
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claimed academic freedom on a variety of grounds, but the religious
dimension of such claims recently received a high-profile media jolt in
Cupertino, California, where an elementary school teacher sued the
school district for religious discrimination after his curricular choices
were subjected to screening for inappropriate religious content by the
principal.3 His case, while ultimately unsuccessful legally, garnered
widespread sympathy as a welcome effort to infuse a secularized
educational orthodoxy with a teacher's own religious sensibility.
On the consumer side, the conscience of a student dissenting
from prevailing social norms has been a pressing jurisprudential
concern since the Supreme Court recognized a student's right not to
pledge allegiance to the majority's sacred ideals.4 The latest evidence
of the dissenting conscience's prominence comes from Dover,
Pennsylvania, where a federal court invalidated the local school
board's clumsy effort to introduce Intelligent Design to the high school
science curriculum. The implicit religious underpinnings of the board
policy, coupled with compulsory attendance laws, sensitized the court
to the plight of the captive student conscience.5
Deference to the individual consciences of both educational
provider and consumer makes sense under our traditional "common
school" framework. Where students and their families are presented
with a single option of publicly financed schooling, and where public
school teachers' employment opportunities are fungible in terms of the
moral content of the curriculum and pedagogical mission, the school is
functionally equivalent to the state. As such, invoking the sanctity of
conscience can bolster the individual's authority in what otherwise
would be a pronounced power disparity in the state's favor. If teachers
and students are understood to operate within a monolithic, unitary
educational system, their claims to be empowered legally to act (or not
act) on conscience in the face of conflicting normative claims by the
system are not to be dismissed lightly.6
3. Williams v. Vidmar, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
4. See W.Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
5. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 712-16 (6th Cir.
2005) (applying endorsement test).
6. This is not to suggest that courts have embraced a robust vision of teachers' or
students' rights, only that there is a logical foundation for invoking a right of conscience under
a "common school" approach to public education. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."), with
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) ("A school need not tolerate
student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational mission' even though the
government could not censor similar speech outside the school.") (citation omitted).
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But the common school framework may be unraveling. School
choice is on the rise in many districts, giving students and teachers an
important tool that can change the power dynamic in their relationship
with any particular school: an exit option. While only a few school
districts have embraced private school vouchers, hundreds of districts
utilize an array of charter, magnet, and other schooling options,
creating paths by which like-minded teachers and students can
affirmatively choose to invest themselves in one school instead of
another based on distinct normative claims embodied in the schools'
respective missions. As school choice bolsters the ability of a school
to create its own identity, the ability to maintain and defend that
identity presupposes a reduced authority for the individual consciences
of the school's prospective constituents.
Under these circumstances, it becomes more difficult to portray
schools as fungible components of an educational monopoly backed
by coercive state power. Schools instead begin to serve a mediating
function, linking students and teachers together in common support of
a mission that is not shared by every school. The viability of this
mediating function has two implications for individual conscience:
first, to the extent that a teacher's conduct is inconsistent with the
school's deliberately chosen mission, the school has a stronger claim
to control the conduct; and second, to the extent that the
implementation of a school's mission creates tension with a dissenting
student's conscience, the student's exit option gives the school a
stronger claim to maintain its mission. Conscience is not erased from
the religious liberty analysis by the rise of school choice, but its
relevance and authority must be viewed from a different perspective.
This article aims to begin tracing the contours of that perspective.
II. MAKING A CASE FOR CONSCIENCE
Near the end of 2004, Stephen Williams emerged from relative
anonymity as a fifth-grade elementary school teacher to provide a
rallying cry for culture war veterans who finally found conclusive
evidence of the public school system's hostility toward Christians.
The media widely reported that Williams had "been forced to stop
distributing copies of the Declaration of Independence to his students
because the document on which our freedom was founded happens to
2006]
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mention God.",7 In reality, the principal required Williams to submit
his lesson plans and readings for approval only after parents
complained that the pervasive incorporation of pro-Christian
viewpoints into Williams's teaching amounted to religious
indoctrination. The court cut through the hyperbole surrounding the
case and observed that there "is a difference between teaching about
religion, which is acceptable, and teaching religion, which is not."
8
The eventual settlement reflected the weakness of the case. 9
But for our purposes, the case's significance lies in the
considerable traction that Williams's conscience-driven cause had with
members of the public concerned with the efficacy of religious
convictions in the educational sphere. Much of the case's notoriety
undoubtedly stemmed from majoritarian concerns over the godless
public school, but the proffered vehicle for remedying that void was
the religious sensibilities of an individual teacher. According to
Williams's own understanding of the dispute, "he merely wanted to
give his 5th graders an accurate picture of the nation's heritage by
enriching his lessons with documents containing references to God, the
Bible, and Jesus Christ.' 1° By violating his constitutional rights, one
columnist insisted, the school district was "engaging in educational
malpractice."" After all, another observed, "we hire teachers who
bring their own backgrounds and passions and beliefs to their
teaching" because "[w]e don't want robots."'12
Numerous organizations devoted to the cause of religious
liberty embraced his case, including the Alliance Defense Fund, which
ultimately brought suit against the school district. The claims, of
course, presumed that Williams should have the authority to act on the
dictates of conscience: a right to "academic freedom-his ability to
speak and teach freely in accordance with the state educational
7. Scarborough Country (MSNBC television broadcast Nov. 29, 2004), available at
2004 WLNR 14281560 (transcript).
8. Williams v. Vidmar, 367 F. Supp. 2d. 1265, 1273 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
9. Wyatt Buchanan, Cupertino; Teacher, District Agree on Religious Materials, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 12, 2005, at B4; Editorial, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 17, 2005, at Al
("Let's call the agreement what it was: a total victory by the district over conservative lawyers
who drummed up a bogus claim of religious persecution.").
10. Caroline Hendrie, References to Religion in Teacher's Handouts Spur Calif. Legal
Fight, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 5, 2005, at 17.
11. Nat Hentoff, Sweet Land of Liberty, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004, at A21.
12. Scott Herhold, Give Teacher Benefit of Doubt Amid Uproar, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Dec. 9, 2004, at lB.
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standards,"' 13 protection from government discrimination based on his
viewpoint that "[this] nation was founded on the Judeo-Christian
heritage,"' i4 and termination of the school's practice excluding "Mr.
Williams' [sic] religious expression." 15 Such language comports with
longstanding calls to give teachers academic freedom to ensure that
students can "explore and develop new ideas," and to provide a
bulwark against education becoming "indoctrination."' 16
Supporters of Williams's cause lost sight of the fact that, if
successful, his case would have been a significant setback for those
who want to close the gap between the values and worldviews of
families and the values and worldviews reflected in their children's
educational environments. One key dimension of religious liberty
claims, especially among their more conservative proponents, is to
increase the efficacy of parents' child-forming decisions, especially as
those decisions relate to the maintenance of a family's faith tradition.
Empowering teachers to speak their minds in defiance of school
authorities threatens to do the opposite; that the substance of
Williams's underlying faith commitments aligned with those of
conservative Christians cannot obfuscate this fact.
The reaction of community parents to the Williams controversy
reflects the tension between teachers' rights and parental authority.17
If one facet of religious liberty is the freedom to transmit values across
generations, and if parents' only power over a child's education lies in
their choice of school, then equipping schools to create a more
deliberate institutional identity is essential. Teacher autonomy
precludes that identity, negating a more meaningful mediating role for
schools in the process. For folks concerned with the hybrid right of
13. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 136, Williams v.
Vidmar, 367 F. Supp. 2d. 1265, (N.D. Cal. 2005) (No. 5:04-CV-4946 JW PVT), available at
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/userdocs/WilliamsvCupertinoComplaint.pdf.
14. Id.at 101.
15. Id. at 147.
16. David K. DeWolf, Stephen C. Meyer, Mark E. Deforrest, Teaching the Origins
Controversy: Science, or Religion, or Speech?, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 39, 105 (2000); see also
Francis J. Beckwith, A Liberty Not Fully Evolved?: The Case of Rodney LeVake and the Right
of Public School Teachers to Criticize Darwinism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1311, 1325 (2002)
("Bringing into the classroom relevant material that supplements the curriculum (and does not
violate any other legal duties), when public school teachers have adequately fulfilled all of
their curricular obligations, is protected speech under the rubric of academic freedom.").
17. Indeed, some parents formed an advocacy group, fearful that Williams's allegations
and the ensuing media coverage would give the country the wrong impression of their
community. Luis Zaragoza, No Apology in Cupertino School Flap, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Jan. 30, 2005, at 1B; see also We the Parents, http://www.stevenscreekparents.org
(website of parents group opposing lawsuit) (last visited Aug. 16, 2006).
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parental autonomy and religious liberty, 18 then, the case for a robust
vision of teachers' rights within the classroom should be a non-starter.
The problem posed by individual conscience on the consumer
(i.e. student) side of the ledger is not nearly so stark. Indeed, few take
issue with the Supreme Court's decision more than sixty years ago
striking down, on free exercise grounds, a West Virginia law
compelling students to salute the flag.19 And few passages garner as
much admiration across the political spectrum as Justice Jackson's
eloquent admonition in support of the ruling that, "[i]f there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein.'
The question now is not whether a student's conscience merits
such deference, but whether such deference can be at least partially
facilitated by affording the student her choice of schools. If a student
chooses to attend a school that has staked out an identity grounded in
non-universal norms and ideals, should the student lose any portion of
her constitutional right to resist the imposition of those norms and
ideals?
The question also bears on our understanding of the
Establishment Clause, not just free exercise. Under the Supreme
Court's endorsement test, as well as under the effects prong of the
Lemon test,21 school policy is viewed through the eyes of the
reasonable student to determine whether the policy amounts to an
endorsement of, or effectively advances, religion. Both approaches
were utilized by the district court judge who recently invalidated the
Intelligent Design "disclaimer" adopted by the Dover, Pennsylvania
school board for inclusion in the evolution curriculum. The disclaimer
read, in part, as follows:
Because Darwin's Theory is a theory, it continues to be
tested as new evidence is discovered. The Theory is
not a fact. Gaps in the Theory exist for which there is
no evidence. A theory is defined as a well-tested
explanation that unifies a broad range of observations.
Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life
18. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
19. See West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
20. Id. at 642.
21. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
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that differs from Darwin's view. The reference book, Of
Pandas and People, is available for students who might
be interested in gaining an understanding of what
Intelligent Design actually involves. With respect to
any theory, students are encouraged to keep an open
mind. The school leaves the discussion of the Origins
of Life to individual students and their families.
22
Defenders of the school board saw this simply as a safeguard
against putting undue pressure on students' religious beliefs through
the teaching of evolution. In this regard, the court's ruling confirmed
for some that "we cannot trust government schools to teach our
children without undermining our values and our worldview," and that
the only viable way of ensuring "that our children are taught properly"
is to "consider the form of education our Founding Fathers believed in
and practiced-private and home schools. ' 23 For many others, though,
the ruling was a sensible acknowledgment of the fact that inserting
contested views on life's transcendent origins into the science
curriculum creates problems for families whose worldviews do not
acknowledge such transcendence. As the district court recognized:
School sponsorship of a religious message is
impermissible because it sends the ancillary message to
members of the audience who are nonadherents "that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community.
24
But, in the school choice era, that straightforward summation
does not pack the same punch. It is by no means obvious that the
message received by students and their families will remain the same
when a system of fungible schools with monopoly power is replaced
by a marketplace of schools offering distinct normative identities,
especially if those identities are articulated and cultivated from below,
by the association of like-minded families, teachers, and
22. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708-09 (6th Cir. 2005).
23. John Eidsmore, An Intelligently Designed Ruling?, NEW AMERICAN, Jan. 23, 2006,
at 35.
24. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 713 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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administrators, rather than imposed from above by a centralized
government body. Certainly for explicitly religious activities or
unmistakably sectarian environments, the Establishment Clause is an
insurmountable obstacle to the direct government funding that drives
public school choice programs. But in contexts where the religious
nature of the school's curriculum is less clear-such as Intelligent
Design or abstinence-only sex education-the obstacle does not appear
so absolute. At a minimum, the constitutional analysis may need to
account for a diminished ability to rely on individual conscience as the
rationale for constraining the mediating function of individual schools.
III. CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON SCHOOL PARADIGM(S)
The elevation of individual conscience has been a sensible
reaction to the paradigms of public schooling that have traditionally
prevailed in the United States. The two most influential paradigms-
the assimilationist model popularized by John Dewey in the early
twentieth century and the marketplace of ideas model emerging from
the anti-authoritarian movement of the 1960s-adopt a critical stance
toward the moral presumptions with which a student emerges from her
family of origin. As Rick Garnett explains, this stance emanates from
the stakes of the project:
Education is the process of and vocation of shaping
souls. Now more than ever, though, the shape our souls
ought to take, and the ends toward which they ought to
be directed, are contested matters. Education is,
therefore, in many ways a contest that the liberal state,
no less than any other, wants to win and is invariably
tempted to "fix."2
5
Especially in matters of morality that are highly contested or
closely linked to religious convictions, private schools are available to
protect some students and their families from the state's pedagogical
overreaching, but for the vast number of students for whom private
schools are not a financially viable option, a limited right of
conscience serves a much cruder, but equally crucial, bulwark
function. And a teacher's right of conscience-usually articulated in
25. Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the
Expressive Association, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1882 (2001).
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the language of academic freedom-facilitates students' critical
reflection on the state's homogenizing impetus (under the
assimilationist model) or makes possible the day-to-day realization of
the marketplace of ideas.
When common schools were avowedly religious, the push to
assimilate students into a shared moral identity was unmistakable.
26
The assimilationist project was secularized, but did not noticeably
dissipate, under the influential work of John Dewey. The ambition of
his vision was made evident by his famous aspiration that "[w]hat the
best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that must the
community want for all of its children." 27 It is not difficult to perceive
a collectivist angle to this ambition, especially when read against
Dewey's profound distrust of subcommunities that cling to tradition
instead of embracing the promise of liberalism:
The isolation and exclusiveness of a gang or clique
brings its antisocial spirit into relief. But this same
spirit is found wherever one group has interests 'of its
own' which shut it out from full interaction with other
groups, so that its prevailing purpose is the protection
of what it has got, instead of reorganization and
progress through wider relationships .... That savage
tribes regard aliens and enemies as synonymous is not
accidental. It springs from the fact that they have
identified their experience with rigid adherence to their
past customs. 28
Dewey invoked such groups as support for his skepticism that
moral education could ever be accomplished by targeting students'
character directly. After all, "direct instruction in morals has been
effective only in social groups where it was a part of the authoritative
control of the many by the few.' 29 To attempt a similar feat in an
enlightened democracy "is to rely upon sentimental magic.' 3 °
26. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 69 (2005) ("The Catholic bid for a constitutional
right to liberty to conscience foundered on the Protestant perception that an exemption from
Bible reading would undermine the schools' project of teaching a shared republican, Christian
morality.").
27. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 13 (1987) (quoting JOHN DEWEY, THE
SCHOOL IN SOCIETY 7 (1900)).
28. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 99 (1916).
29. Id. at 411.
30. Id.
20061
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This is not to suggest that Dewey shunned the possibility of
moral education, for he believed that "[a]ll education which develops
power to share effectively in social life is moral" because "[i]t forms a
character which not only does the particular deed socially necessary
but one which is interested in that continuous readjustment which is
essential to growth., 31  The "essential moral interest," then, is
"[i]nterest in learning from all the contacts of life.",32 In other words,
the moralizing force of education consists of its ability to foster a
willingness to adapt among students as they encounter the worldviews
and lived realities of others. The homogenizing implications are clear.
As Diane Ravitch puts it, in Dewey's "conception of democracy ...
the particularities of neighborhood, region, religion, ethnicity, race,
and other distinctive features of communal life are isolating factors, all
of which may be expected to dissolve as individuals interact and share
their concerns."
33
In a significant sense, Dewey succeeded in replacing the
homogenizing Protestant common school with the homogenizing
secular common school. Joseph Viteritti observes that this "aggressive
secularism would become a creed in itself."3 4 Indeed, Dewey seemed
to revel in that fact, insisting that by "bringing together those of
different nationalities, languages, traditions and creeds, in assimilating
them together upon a basis of what is common and public in endeavor
and achievement," the schools "are performing an infinitely significant
religious work., 35  He was, according to Viteritti, "incapable of
comprehending the oREressive nature of his own self-righteous
approach to education."
Dewey helped shape our nation's understanding of public
education, but he was not alone in espousing the assimilationist
message. To take one prominent example, when Oregon passed a law
31. Id. at418.
32. Id.
33. Diane Ravitch, Education and Democracy, in MAKING GOOD CITIZENS: EDUCATION
AND CIVIL SOCIETY 15, 21 (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 2001).
34. JOSEPH VITERITT, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
CIVIL SOCIETY 158 (1999).
35. Id. at 159 (quoting John Dewey, Religion in Our Schools, 6 HIBBERT J. 800, 806-07
(July 1908)).
36. Id. This self-righteousness and marginalization of tradition are equally evident in
Dewey's emphasis on science as a unifying force, calling it "the office of intelligence, in
projection and control of new experiences, pursued systematically, intentionally, and on a
scale due to freedom from limitations of habit," going so far as to label it "the sole
instrumentality of conscious, as distinct from accidental, progress." DEwEY, supra note 28, at
266.
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in 1922 that required all children to attend public schools,37 much of
the credit went to a campaign in which supporters argued that public
schools should "[m]ix those with prejudices in the public school
melting pot for a few years while their minds are plastic, and finally
bring out the finished product-a true American."
38
The presumption that schools should function primarily as
socializing institutions held sway, to varying degrees, until the 1960s,
when anti-authoritarianism triggered educational innovations grounded
in critical thinking skills.39  Schools began to be reimagined as
marketplaces of ideas in which students would not be indoctrinated
into collectively shared moral norms, but would be exposed to a
"values clarification" curriculum. The autonomy-stifling nature of
Dewey's assimilationist program was recognized, but it was replaced
with an individualist understanding of student well-being that not only
marginalized parents, but affirmatively strived to achieve critical
distance between them and their child.
The very rationale of common schools, under the individualist
approach, stems from "the basic fact that children are independent
persons-in-the-making with their own basic interests and their own
lives to lead.",40  And the person-to-be-made should, at a minimum,
honor the basic premises of liberalism, meaning that they "should be
alert to the possibility that religious imperatives, or even inherited
notions of what it means to be a good parent, spouse, or lover, might in
fact run afoul of guarantees of equal freedom., 41 Those who resist
should not stand in the way; Stephen Macedo, for example, perceives
no reason "why public educational policy should be guided by the
peculiarities of a small number of people whose needs for
psychological closure place them in opposition to liberal democratic
civic practices and virtues, including mutual respect amidst diversity
and cooperation among group lines."
37. The law was subsequently invalidated as an unconstitutional intrusion on parental
autonomy by the Supreme Court. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
38. Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., Piece and Parental Liberty as a Core Value in Educational
Policy, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 491, 492 (2001) (quoting statement of the Imperial Council,
A.A.O. Nobles Mystic Shrine, reprinted in WALTER MARCUS PIERCE, OREGON SCHOOL CASES:
COMPLETE RECORD 269, 732 (1925)).
39. Bruce Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority:
Public Schools as Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 667 (1987).
40. STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIvIC EDUCATION IN A
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 233 (2000).
41. Id. at 239.
42. Id. at 252.
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The autonomy-driven approach comported nicely with rulings
by the Supreme Court from the same era, most notably Tinker, in
which the majority reasoned:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be
enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not
possess absolute authority over our students. Students
in school as well as out of school are "persons" under
our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental
rights which the State must respect, just as they
themselves must respect their obligations to the State.
In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-
circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to
communicate. They may not be confined to the
expression of those sentiments that are officially
approved. In the absence of a specific showing of
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech,
students are entitled to freedom of expression of their
views.
43
Note that the central place for individual autonomy-secured
by collectively observed liberal norms-is a departure from Dewey's
emphasis on the creation of socially amenable and infinitely adaptable
American citizens. But the student's attainment of individual
autonomy through schooling still places tremendous pressure on the
student's continued identification with her family's worldview. John
Goodland, for example, asserts that "[s]chools should liberate students
from the ways of thinking imposed by religions and other traditions of
thought."44  And in turning the marketplace norm into a reality,
Macedo observes that today's urban high schools "embody the variety
and choice of the liberal community as a whole: they aim not to
reinforce particularistic communal norms but to provide access to a
world beyond the family and its closest affiliations."
45
For some, the marketplace model does not go nearly far
enough. Martin Redish and Kevin Finnerty caution that, through
public schooling, "the state is able to engage in a dangerous form of
political, social, or moral thought control that potentially interferes
43. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
44. VrrERIrI, supra note 34, at 167 (quoting Goodland).
45. MACEDO, supra note 40, at 257.
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with a citizen's subsequent exercise of individual autonomy. ' 46 They
propose an "anti-indoctrination" model of the First Amendment,
urging "the judiciary to reasonably police the educational process in
order to restrict values inculcation to that essential minimum degree
required for the educational process to function. 47 School programs
or messages regarding racial or gender equality, patriotism, or ethnic
tolerance would be "presumptively unconstitutional because they are
improper government attempts to inculcate socio-political values in a
uniquely impressionable audience. 4 8 Under this approach, the
autonomy of individual students is of such paramount importance that
the school must abdicate completely any value-inculcative role.
One problem in facilitating critical moral reasoning by
liberating students from direct value inculcation is that it disregards the
inherently social nature of moral judgment:
[O]f course that [values clarification] approach was
hopelessly superficial because it left students essentially
on their own .... We are not, after all, social atoms,
free or even able to create a moral universe out of our
own resources; we are born into communities and
traditions, into a world rich with theories and practices
on which we can and must draw in order to think in an
informed and truly critical way. Morality is not
intellectually free-floating, a matter of arbitrary choices
or merely personal values. Moral judgments and
conceptions of morality are rooted in historical,
cultural, and intellectual contexts that make sense of
them.49
Because values are embedded in relationships, the notion that
lessons can be imparted through the teacher-student relationship
without accompanying moral messages is dubious. 50  More broadly,
seeking to foster critical reflection by drawing out a child from her
46. Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free
Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
62, 67 (2002).
47. Id. at 69.
48. Id. at 70.
49. Warren A. Nord, Moral Disagreement, Moral Education, Common Ground, in
MAKING GOOD CITIZENS: EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 33, at 142, 147.
50. See Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling the Free Speech
Clause with Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
769, 778 (1995).
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embeddedness within a particular culture, family, and faith tradition
may compromise the realization of a more fulsome autonomy by
imposing on her a critical stance toward life choices that she may
authentically be inclined to make.51 And to the extent that the message
purports to offer a smorgasbord of values to pick from, schools may be
encouraging "in children a false subjectivism or relativism, giving rise
to the logical inference that no one set of values can be right.
52
These grounds for skepticism toward values clarification have
led some to question the relentless focus on the autonomy of
individual students. Amy Gutmann, for example, asks "[w]hy must
freedom be the sole end of education, given that most of us value
things that conflict with freedom?" and so why should we "prevent
teachers from cultivating moral character by biasing the choices of
children toward good lives and, if necessary, by constraining the range
of lives that children are capable of choosing when they mature?
53
Gutmann's vision of moral teaching should not necessarily reassure
families whose worldviews do not align with secularist norms, though,
for she also sees education as functioning to "convert children away
from the intensely held [religious] beliefs of their parents." 54
But practical obstacles present themselves even as the
theoretical justification for value inculcation becomes clear. Putting
aside momentarily the question of religion, space for the inculcation of
countercultural values of any stripe appears to be negligible as long as
each school functions as a fungible component of the state's monopoly
power.55  Even relatively uncontroversial norms grow elusive in
51. Rosemary Salomone explains that the educational process
touches children deeply through specific visions of the good life. These
visions typically reaffirm those valued by the larger secular culture, but
they may also negate the vision fostered by the family. Education exerts a
powerful indoctrinative force. The scope and direction of that force are
largely a function of district policy, school practice, and teacher discretion.
In effect, this process potentially can undermine children's autonomy by
forcing them to choose a life contrary to that of their parents and
community.
Rosemary Salomone, Common Education and the Democratic Ideal, in MAKING GOOD
CITIZENS: EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 33, at 223.
52. Bitensky, supra note 50, at 778.
53. GUTMANN, supra note 27, at 37.
54. Id. at 121.
55. Mark Holmes, Education and Pluralism in an Age of Pluralism, in MAKING GOOD
CITIZENS: EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 33, at 196 ("Can a state monopoly of
schooling successfully inculcate values that are foreign to the larger society?").
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modem public schools as the varied constituents and panoply of values
on display erode any sense of common identity.
56
Viewed against these traditional conceptions of public
education, the case for conscience is formidable. By presuming to
shape students from wildly divergent backgrounds into a common
model of the right-thinking American citizen, the assimilationist
approach invites the creation of a limited constitutional buffer around
individual students who resist the more aggressive efforts to shape
them. To a lesser degree, the assimilationist approach also justifies
protecting teachers who are called to conform in their conduct and
pedagogy to the prescribed model, both for their own liberty interests
and for the instrumental value of that liberty to the extent that it
provides students with critical perspectives on the state indoctrination.
The marketplace approach's focus on achieving critical
distance between the student and the traditions from which she
emerges provides a rationale for conscience claims not so much for
any unified message it imparts, but for the alienating implications of
the fact that so many messages are imparted without concern for the
tension they create-both by their substance and by their sheer
number-with the student's previously governing worldview or
values. And the teacher's claim of conscience is instrumentally
valuable, for without an empowered and independent voice for
teachers, the collectivizing reach of school authorities could easily
compromise the very premise of the marketplace approach.57
Both the teachers' and students' claims to conscience under the
assimilationist and marketplace approaches to public education gain
traction because of the lack of an exit option and because of the
collective manner in which a school's moral identity is imposed within
a monopolistic, centralized system of fungible schools. The concerns
56. Id. at 205 ("A genuine citizenship is more likely to be found in a fundamentalist
school, despite its intolerance, than in a comprehensive high school, with its tolerance of
almost everything and parallel belief in almost nothing.").
57. In a Supreme Court ruling invalidating New York's loyalty oath requirement for
teachers, Justice Brennan wrote:
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy
over the classroom .... The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of
ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposures to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a
multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative
selection.'
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citation omitted).
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driving the case for conscience change markedly with the advent of
school choice.
IV. SCHOOL CHOICE AND CONSCIENCE
The school choice movement has been exhaustively
documented and debated in countless fora, and those efforts will not be
rehashed here. Much of the focus has been on the inclusion of private
schools in voucher programs, particularly in the wake of the Supreme
Court's ruling that voucher funds directed by parents to religious
schools do not violate the Establishment Clause. Clearly, if students
are financially empowered to choose among a variety of secular and
religious schools, the compulsion to protect their individual
consciences from the moral or religious content embodied in the
curriculum or environment at any particular school dissipates
significantly. A student whose faith tradition rejects Darwinian
evolution, for example, has a much less compelling conscience claim
when she can choose to attend a religious school that introduces
Intelligent Design theory in science class than if her only option is a
public school where evolution is the only theory presented.
However, a narrower focus on the rise of choice within the
public school system makes sense for two reasons. First, public school
choice is much more widespread than voucher programs encompassing
private schools, which have thus far been limited largely to districts in
Florida, Cleveland, and Milwaukee. Second, it presents more
challenging and nuanced conscience implications than voucher
programs do because the latter entail spending decisions by parents
who have been given government funds, while the former entail direct
spending decisions by the government. An expansive understanding
of school autonomy on religious issues will at some point bump into
the Establishment Clause; the question is whether school choice alters
the relevant boundaries, even in the public school sphere.
Charter schools are at the center of these developments because
they so fundamentally change the prevailing conceptions of public
schools while remaining unmistakably public institutions. Approved
by a school board for a fixed period of time and funded by a
combination of public and private sources, charter schools fall
"between the ultimate independence of private schools and the
58. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
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bureaucratic constraints of traditional public schools., 59 Nearly 3000
new schools have been launched since states began enacting charter
legislation in the early 1990s. 60  In states with strong charter laws,
"school-level personnel [have] wide discretion over their budgetary
and personnel decisions and [are released] from all regulations except
those that deal with civil rights, health, and safety."61 As a result,
individual schools are empowered to determine "dress codes, teaching
materials, and the overall theme of the curriculum. ' 62  Across the
nation, charter schools are proposed by community members along
myriad lines of distinctiveness in their pedagogy, environments, and
service objectives, including emphases of themes like leadership,
particular fields like technology, music, or dance, or specific cultural
traditions or underserved minority populations.
63
Those willing to put forth the considerable effort necessary to
create and maintain a charter school are generally motivated to do so
by the insufficiency of current public school offerings within their
district. They indicate a desire "to achieve more managerial
autonomy" in order to "realize an alternative educational vision or to
serve a special target population of students whose needs were not
adequately being met in existing schools., 64 While nothing precludes
a given charter school from organizing itself around the assimilation or
marketplace approaches, 65 they do not all limit themselves to those
two models. The result is an array of educational offerings that
replaces "the rigid, and frankly anachronistic, concept of the common
school" with "the more flexible and accommodating notion of
common education. ' 66  Rosemary Salomone offers a helpful
comparison:
The one seeks to homogenize students by imparting a
fixed set of values through a system of neighborhood
59. JOHN F. WnTE, THE MARKET APPROACH TO EDUCATION 17 (2000).
60. See Amy Stuart Wells, Charter Schools: Lessons in Limits, WASH. POST, Dec. 29,
2004, at A19.
61. VIrEmTrI, supra note 34, at 65.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 72-73.
65. "A court faced with twin teacher-speech cases arising out of two such dissimilar
hypothetical schools should employ a legal rubric allowing consideration of the unique school
goals and school designs." Kevin G. Welner, Locking Up the Marketplace of Ideas and
Locking Out School Reform: Courts' Imprudent Treatment of Controversial Teaching in
America's Public Schools, 50 UCLA L. REV. 959, 1019 (2003).
66. Salomone, supra note 51, at 226-27.
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schools funded partially by the state and controlled by
local government. This 'one size fits all' approach
historically has shown little if any regard for differences
in family values or divergent perspectives on
educational practice. The other aims to impart a
common core of political principles, virtues, and
understandings while recognizing differences at the
broad margins. The focus on common education
supports contemporary initiatives that allow families
greater choice, and therefore voice, in the education of
their children.
67
In this regard, schools have the potential to be important
relationally, as their connection to both the individual and the state
equips them to fulfill a mediating role, serving as bridges between
families and the surrounding, impersonal society.68  Public schools
already serve a limited mediating function whenever the state or
federal governments defer to the judgment of local communities in the
schools' operation,69 especially as that judgment pertains to the values
properly embodied in the educational environment. 70 But the efforts to
cultivate either a marketplace of ideas within each school or to impose
certain universalized normative ideals through the curriculum of every
school have drastically reduced the efficacy of particular parents'
values in the educational experience.
When there are a variety of schools to choose from
representing different normative ideals, schools can bring a greater
sense of identity, meaning, and shared purpose to students and their
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1715
(1988).
Intermediate organizations fill the gap between individuals and the state.
On the one hand, they are vehicles that reflect and amplify individual
members' interests. On the other, they are subnational bases for social
integration and the formation of ideals and beliefs. They are both
instrumental and formative, both mechanical and organic, both conveyor
belts for interests and nurturing grounds for values.
Id.
69. See Bruce Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority:
Public Schools as Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663 (1987).
70. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) ("The
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is
inappropriate properly rests with the school board.").
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families. 71 The mediating function expands considerably as a given
school is empowered to reflect more closely the values and priorities
of its constituents,72 solidifying their trust in the institution.73
It is not difficult to appreciate that an empowered school does
not invariably bring about a heightened mediating function. In those
cases where school autonomy is unhinged from parental choice, the
outcome can be jolting. This was evident recently when parents
brought suit against a California school district after their children in
first, third, and fifth grade were given a research survey in class that,
unbeknownst to the parents, inquired about sexual topics such as the
frequency of "thinking about sex" and "thinking about other people's
private parts." 74 The Ninth Circuit ruled that the district's failure to
disclose the survey's contents to the parents before obtaining their
consent was not actionable under the Constitution because the parental
right to control the upbringing of children, as recognized in the
landmark cases of Pierce v. Society of Sisters75 and Meyer v.
Nebraska,76 "does not extend beyond the threshold of the school
door." 77 In other words, "once parents make the choice as to which
school their children will attend, their fundamental right to control the
education of their children is, at least, substantially diminished., 78 The
problem is that for parents without the financial means to choose a
non-public school, the right to control their children's education is
illusory, and the school's potential mediating power appears, to
dissenting families, more akin to heavy-handed indoctrination.
71. See Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Rethinking the Value of
Associations, 79 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 949 (2004).
72. "A strong degree of institutional autonomy is a crucial ingredient in empowering the
school's mediating role." Hafen, supra note 69, at 730.
73. "[M]y trust in a particular social organization underwrites my truth claims. Trust is
therefore epistemologically prior to truth." Posting of Hanno Kaiser to Law & Society Blog,
http://www.lawsocietyblog.con/archives/16# (Sept. 6, 2005).
74. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 2005).
75. In Pierce, the Court held that the state could not require parents to send their
children to public schools, for "[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only." 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925).
76. In Meyer, the Court struck down a state law banning the teaching of foreign
languages to students before they graduated from eighth grade, reasoning that there was
insufficient justification for state interference "with the opportunities of pupils to acquire
knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their own." 262 U.S.
390, 401 (1923).
77. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1207.
78. Id. at 1206.
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But when students and their families are given a meaningful
opportunity to embrace a school's unique identity, the robust
understanding of school autonomy expressed in Fields creates a
powerful mediating relationship between families and the broader
community. Witness the dramatic impact of the Harvey Milk School
in New York City, a high school devoted to providing a safe haven for
gay and lesbian youth. The school, which requires the consent of
parents before students can enroll, is permeated by normative
messages that are far from universally accepted-e.g., many
conservatives object to its legitimization of homosexuality while many
progressives object to its "self-exile" of gay students from the straight
community. 79 The mediating power, though, is unmistakable: the high
school serves as a thick community centered on a common ideal that is
hotly disputed by the surrounding society, providing students with a
shared sense of identity, purpose, and meaning.8° If a student enrolled
or a teacher sought employment at Harvey Milk with knowledge of its
unique mission, they would be hard-pressed to earn a sympathetic
audience for a claim that the school's environment and curriculum
unfairly impinged on their deeply held convictions that homosexuality
is immoral. The claim to conscience, from a common-sense
perspective, would be a non-starter.
Even those who defend a fairly aggressive state role in
transmitting liberal values through the schools have begun to
appreciate the appeal of decentralized authority in that process. Amy
Gutmann rejects the value-free presumptions of the marketplace
approach,81 but she also rejects the collectivizing premise of Dewey's
value-laden approach, conceding that "[a] democratic society must not
be constrained to legislate what the wisest parents want for their
child," as long as the society does not "legislate policies that render
democracy repressive or discriminatory." 82 Stephen Macedo embraces
79. See John Colapinto, The Harvey Milk School Has No Right to Exist: Discuss, NEW
YORK MAG., Feb. 7, 2005, available at http://newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/features/
10970.
80. Id. (describing school's "aging out" policy requiring students to leave the school by
age 21 because they are so resistant to departure).
81. Gutmann supports the "nonneutral education of states and families" because
the good of children includes not just freedom of choice, but also
identification with and participation in the good of their family and the
politics of their society .... To focus exclusively on the value of freedom,
or even on the value of moral freedom, neglects the value that parents and
citizens may legitimately place on partially prejudicing the choices of
children by their familial and political heritages.
GUTMANN, supra note 27, at 43.
82. Id. at 15.
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some differentiation, at least in process and form, advocating for
schools as "moral communities":
The public high school could be more like the Catholic
school by being organized on a scale capable of
sustaining a sense of community among students and
teachers. The schools must also have enough autonomy
so that they can be self-governing and develop a shared
ethos. An element of parental choice is important so
that children want to be there. Individual schools
should have the ability to hire and fire teachers to
ensure that a shared sense of mission and purpose can
be sustained-that is, to ensure that the teachers want to
be there as much as the students do.
83
Though many will contest the substance 84  or the non-
negotiable status85 of the values prudently transmitted according to
these theorists, it is significant that the broader trend appears to be
toward reconceiving schools as "voluntary associations that
participants have joined as a matter of their own free will. 86
So while Stephen Williams's supporters sympathetically
portray him as the noble individual standing alone against monolithic
83. MACEDO, supra note 40, at 264.
84. See id. at 10-11.
For a liberal democracy to thrive and not only survive, many of its citizens
should develop a shared commitment to a range of political values and
virtues: tolerance, mutual respect, and active cooperation among fellow
citizens of various races, creeds, and styles of life; a willingness to think
critically about public affairs and participate actively in the democratic
process and in civil society; and a willingness to affirm the supreme
political authority of principles that we can publicly justify along with all
our reasonable fellow citizens.
Id. See also GUTMANN, supra note 27, at 838 (A democratic theory of education recognizes
the importance of empowering citizens to make educational policy and also of constraining
their choices among policies in accordance with those principles-of non-repression and
nondiscrimination-that preserve the intellectual and social foundation of democratic
deliberations."); Bitensky, supra note 50, at 838 (listing values to be embraced as "good
starting point for schools in preparing their students to maintain democracy and civilized order
in the twenty-first century," including "a commitment to peaceful coexistence, environmental
conservation, the United Nations, the rule of law, and tolerance toward other people; and an
abhorrence of genocide, invidious discrimination, torture and other inhuman punishments").
85. "Reinvigorated communities may be an important part of educational reform, but
only insofar as they contribute to the full range of our public purposes, which includes the
well-being of children, the health of local communities, and the larger civic ideals of the
nation." MACEDO, supra note 40, at 260.
86. VITERITrI, supra note 34, at 217.
102 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
state power, the spread of school choice may require us to shift our
perspective. If there is a range of distinct schools embodying a variety
of deliberately crafted normative ideals, teachers' rights cases may be
more accurately portrayed as pitting a voluntarily constructed
subcommunity founded on a distinct identity against a designated
agent of that subcommunity who threatens its continued viability. If
the teacher's exercise of conscience threatens the identity staked out
by the school, school autonomy must trump. There is no obvious legal
impediment to such an approach once we leave behind the intraschool
marketplace model, 87 especially where knowledge of the basis for a
particular restraint on conscience can be imputed to the teacher before
any dispute arises by virtue of the school's ongoing articulation of
mission. 8
It is fairly easy to see how school choice reduces the power of
a dissenting student's claim to conscience generally, but it is less clear
whether a reduced claim to conscience expands a school's discretion to
implement policies or practices that would otherwise run afoul of the
Establishment Clause. This article does not purport to reach
conclusive answers on this question, but it offers preliminary
reflections on why we may need to rethink the role of conscience in
our understanding of the Establishment Clause as applied to public
school districts where meaningful parental choice is available.
One reason is that the Supreme Court's decision in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris89  makes more difficult any sharp demarcation
between publicly and privately funded schools when it comes to
religion. In Zelman, the Supreme Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that
Cleveland's school voucher program did not violate the Establishment
Clause. In so ruling, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, which had
87. Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers
to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1356 (1976).
The freedom of expression justification for teacher control is premised on
an analytical model of education which views schools as a market place of
ideas. There is no historical or precedential basis, however, for
concluding that the market place of ideas model is constitutionally
compelled over the traditional value inculcation model. Thus, in the final
analysis, teachers' constitutional rights, in and out of the classroom, do not
extend beyond the first amendment rights of all citizens.
Id. See also Ralph D. Mawdsley, School Board Control Over Education and a Teacher's
Right to Privacy, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 609, 624-25 (2004) ("Efforts under a variety of
legal theories to change or to personalize school curriculum have generally been rejected.").
88. See Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, Academic Freedom, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 17, 24
(2005) (suggesting that "public school restrictions on teacher speech should emphasize
substantial before-the-fact control, while curtailing the availability of after-the-fact sanction").
89. 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
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invalidated the program in light of the fact that eighty-six percent of
the participating schools (46 of 56) were religious and ninety-six
percent of students using vouchers enrolled in religious schools. 90 The
Supreme Court concluded that the structure of the program did not
favor the participation of religious over nonreligious schools.
91
Similarly unconvincing to the Court was the fact that ninety-six
percent of participating students chose religious schools, as it is
"irrelevant even to the constitutionality of a direct aid program that a
vast majority of program benefits went to religious schools.' 92 The
Court suggested that the availability of magnet schools and privately
run community schools, in addition to the traditional public schools,
made the religious schools' inclusion less problematic.
Zelman's relevance is limited, however, by the fact that parents
under the Cleveland plan were provided with government funds and
they, in turn, directed the funds to the school of their choice. 94 The
constitutional inquiry is different when a government agency approves
a proposal for a new school and then funds its start-up directly. It
bears further exploration, though, whether the Zelman Court's
approval of state funding of expressly religious educational programs
pursuant to the decisions of private individuals may suggest that even
charter schools could merit a different Establishment Clause analysis
than the traditional public school system.
Three factors in combination could warrant broader discretion
for the school: first, if the disputed element of the charter school is not
sectarian or even expressly religious, but represents a moral claim that
may be driven in significant part by a religious worldview (such as
abstinence-only sex education 95); second, if the element has been
introduced by the self-selected constituents of the school, rather than
imposed top-down on all schools in the district; 96 and third, if the state
90. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000).
91. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2469.
92. Id. at 2470 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 2469.
94. Id. at 2468 ("[Wie have repeatedly recognized that no reasonable observer would
think a neutral program of private choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a
result of the numerous independent decisions of private individuals, carries with it the
imprimatur of government endorsement.").
95. See Frank Ravitch, Some Thoughts on Religion, Abstinence Only, and Sex Education
in the Public Schools, CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. (forthcoming, draft on file with author)
(suggesting that religious motivation of abstinence-only sex education programs may render
them unconstitutional).
96. Rich Schragger advocates "a jurisprudence that shows both some increased respect
for local choices and some increased suspicion of centralized ones, whether those choices
appear to favor or disfavor religion in any particular case." Richard Schragger, The Role of
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action involved-granting a charter to the school, which triggers the
funding-was based on unquestionably legitimate educational
objectives, not on the disputed element, which may be but one of many
components of the school's stated mission. The two pre-Zelman cases
in which charter school practices were alleged to violate the
Establishment Clause do not seem to have triggered different treatment
by the courts than a traditional public school,97 but the rationale of
Zelman, along with the proper set of facts and understanding of
conscience, may shift the analysis, if not the outcome.
Even apart from Zelman, the rationale of the endorsement test
espoused by Justice O'Connor may not be as confining in a choice
regime as when it is enforced against schools functioning as fungible
components of the state's monopoly power. The test holds that the
Establishment Clause prohibits the government from either endorsing
or disapproving religion, and endorsement is understood as sending "a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, members of the political community." 98 Courts
must evaluate the nature of the relationship between the government
and any religious organizations involved, as well as the content of the
message embodied in the policy or practice at issue. Determining
whether the government acted neutrally toward religion will turn on
"the judicial interpretation of social facts." 99
As a matter of logic, the exit option made available by school
choice makes it less reasonable for a student to view herself as a
political outsider simply because a particular school embraces a moral
claim with which she disagrees. By way of obvious example, the
existence of the Harvey Milk School hardly justifies a conclusion that
gay and lesbian youth are "insiders," while those who disagree with
the school's premise are "not full members of the political
community." What is not clear is whether the exit option changes the
endorsement dynamic on religious matters. Certainly if a charter
school was proposed with a mission of spreading the gospel of Jesus
the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1810 (2004).
The "fragmented authority" reflected in school choice "ensures that no one political authority
has a monopoly on religion-regulating and -benefiting powers, thereby diffusing both the
state's power over religion and religion's power over the state." Id. at 1873-74.
97. See Robert J. Martin, Charting the Court Challenges to Charter Schools, 109 PENN
ST. L. REv. 43, 97-99 (2004) (discussing Daugherty v. Vanguard Charter Sch. Acad., 116 F.
Supp. 2d 897, 903 (W.D. Mich. 2000) and Porta v. Klagholz, 19 F. Supp. 2d 290, 293 (D.N.J.
1998)).
98. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 693-94.
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Christ, the government's decision to grant the charter would send a
strong message of endorsing religion, regardless of how many viable
alternative schools students could choose. But suppose that the
proposal stated only that the school would shape students holistically:
physically, mentally, emotionally, and spiritually, and that each
student was to be treated as "a significant creature entrusted with the
weighty role of steward of Earth." 100 And while not communicating
any overtly religious messages through the curriculum, assume that the
school decides to set aside time each day for student reflection,
meditation or prayer, 1° 1 creates an externship program that includes
opportunities to work with a variety of religious or secular
organizations, institutes abstinence-only sex education based on the
school's perception of adolescents' lack of emotional readiness for
sexual activity, and offers a class in which the existential implications
of Darwinian evolution are explored.
If such measures were introduced as a legislative package to be
imposed on all schools within a jurisdiction, would that pose a more
formidable Establishment Clause problem than when a single charter
school adopts them? Two reasons suggest an answer in the
affirmative: first, the state's role as overseer of the educational
marketplace, rather than as arbiter of collectivized educational norms,
makes the appearance of government endorsement more attenuated;
and second, the student's exit option and perception of the broader
marketplace makes the subjective impact of a potential government
endorsement less problematic. 1° 2 This is, of course, no guarantee that
the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence will carve
out a special place for charter schools; it simply reflects a rationale for
the Court to do so.
100. This particular phrase comes from the mission statement of Tarek Ibn Ziyad
Academy, a charter school in Minnesota focusing on the Arabic language and the cultural
traditions of the Middle East, East Africa, North Africa, and South Asia. Tarek Ibn Ziyad
Academy, Our School, http://www.tizacademy.com/Our-School.html (last visited Aug. 16,
2006).
101. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down Alabama law that added
words "or voluntary prayer" to statute authorizing student moment of silence).
102. Cf Schragger, supra note 96, at 1876.
The endorsement inquiry contains an implicit theory of scale. To
determine whether a member of a community would feel like an outsider
in that community, one must define what that community is and what
membership in it means. . . . Religious exclusion is intimate and
interpersonal; it is a message conveyed at close range, not across long
distances or through institutional actors.
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V. CONCLUSION
This analysis is not meant to suggest that the diminished
relevance of conscience should be interpreted as a license for schools
to embrace any normative vision that is sustainable in the marketplace
without regard for the foundational premises of liberal education. An
educational provider should still be expected to fulfill the objectives
for which public education exists in the first place. The fact that a
school's mediating role demands freedom to pursue its own identity
does not mean that the mediating role merits a degree of freedom that
would effectively trump every other government interest. But there is
considerable space within the broad constraints of liberalism for
schools to pursue divergent moral values. These broad constraints
should be defined and articulated primarily by the state through its
oversight function, not through the constitutionally empowered
resistance of individual teachers and students. Teacher autonomy, and
to a lesser extent student autonomy, are inconsistent with the level of
school autonomy that is necessary to cultivate a system of public
education that is accountable to its constituents and does not shirk
from the task of value inculcation.
Among schools that embody legitimate educational visions, the
school's autonomy, even under the most robust framework of parental
choice, is not unlimited. The sanctity of conscience cannot be
replaced by institutional power that runs roughshod over
nonconforming students and teachers. Conscience must give way only
when the substance of the individual's conscience-driven claim
directly threatens the realization or maintenance of the institutional
identity previously staked out by the school. 10 3 School choice brings a
skeptical eye toward individual conscience not because it seeks to
replace dissent with a white-washed government indoctrination zone.
Rather, school choice seeks to maximize the efficacy of parents' child-
forming decisions in a way that takes values, and value pluralism,
seriously. Under a one-size-fits-all approach to public education,
conscience provides a voice to individuals who do not fit. In the
currently unfolding era where public education does not presume that
one size will suffice, the role of conscience is considerably less clear.
103. In this regard, the dynamic reflects the import of the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), in which the Court upheld the Scouts' associational
right to exclude an openly gay scout leader when the organization interpreted its mission of
teaching boys to be "morally straight" to warrant such an exclusion.
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